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I. 
INTRODUCTORY STATEMENT 
Both parties have previously submitted detailed factual and procedural backgrounds on this 
matter. Plaintiffs/Appellants/Cross-Respondents MELISSA K. BAUGHMAN and NATHON A. 
BAUGHMAN will be referred to herein as "Baughmans". Defendants/Respondents/Cross-
Appellants CAPITAL ONE, N.A., MORTGAGE ELECTRONIC REGISTRATION SYSTEMS, 
INC., CHEVY CHASE BANK, F.S.B. US BANK N.A., CORPORATE TRUST SERVICES, 
TRUSTEE and WELLS FARGO BANK, N.A., will be referred to herein as "Banking Entities". 
With regards to the "Nature of the Case' as set forth by the Banking Entities states that "all 
the issues in this case involve the enforceability of the Deed of Trust" is unsupported by the lower 
Court's decision and the record on review herein. The Baughmans have consistently raised the 
issue of the Banking Entities' standing to bring the action of foreclosure which must be determined 
before the enforceability is determined by this Court-whether as a result of the statute oflimitations 
or otherwise and breach of the terms of the Note and Deed of Trust as recognized by the Court in 
its Memorandum decision. See Vol. III, p. 627 the last sentence of the first full paragraph wherein 
the Court found "Lastly the Baughmans asserted that the sale of the property breached the 
Deed of Trust". 
Further their statement that the Baughmans "executed a Deed of Trust against an 
investment prope1iy" is not supported by the facts and cites to no record supporting the same. 
Baughmans had purchased the property as their primary residence and in order to make ends meet 
they moved in with their parents and rented the property in the summer months. In their answers 
to Baughman's Complaint the Banking Entities admitted that the Baughman purchased the 
property as their residence. R., Vol I, p. 29 paragraph 11; R., Vol I, p. 48 paragraph 9. Further, 
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Banking Entities' statement that Baughman's sued the lender to avoid the deed of trust and lien 
on property, is not supp01ied by citation to the reasons 
action are set out in their Complaint and Amended Complaint which clearly speak for themselves. 
R., Vol. I, pp. 26-32 and R., Vol., I pp. 87-94. 
The Banking Entities efforts to paint this as a case were the Baughmans are attempting to 
get a 'windfall' diverts the attention from the Banking Entities failure to comport their actions with 
applicable regulations and applicable law, and for the Banking Entities to accept responsibility for 
bungling this foreclosure. 
II. 
ISSUES PRESENTED BY BANKING ENTITIES 
The Banking Entities raise four issues on appeal: 
1. Statute of Limitations and Maturity Date. The Banking Entities argument that the 
statute of limitations in I. C. § 5-214A can only begin to run from the maturity date, if a maturity 
date is stated on the face of the deed of trust, is erroneous and urges this court to adopt a meaning 
of 'maturity date' contradictory to the plain and accepted meaning of maturity date. See The Union 
Central Life Insurance Company v. Keith, 58 Idaho 471, 474-475, 74 P.2d 699, 700 (Idaho 1937). 
I. C. § 5-214A states that the five (5) year statute oflimitations runs " ... from the maturity date of 
the obligation or indebtedness secured by such mortgage." 
In the case at hand the lender accelerated the indebtedness thus advancing the maturity date 
of the obligation and triggering the commencement of the running of the statute of limitation. See 
R., Vol. II, pp. 384-387; R., Vol. II, p. 389; R., Vol. II, pp. 393-394; That acceleration advances 
the maturity date and triggers the start of the statute of limitation is clear, see United States v. Dos 
Cabezas Corp., 995 F.2d 1486, 1490 (9th Cir. 1993): 
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In the case of default on an instrument containing an automatic acceleration 
clause, "the debt is fully matured and the statute of limitations begins 
running when the debtor first defaults." 54 C.J.S. Limitations of Actions § 
153. But if the acceleration clause in a note is optional, the debtor is not 
liable for payment on future nondelinquent installments "until the creditor 
chooses to take advantage of the clause and accelerate the balance. Unless 
the creditor exercises the option, the statute of limitations applies to each 
installment separately, and does not begin to run on any installment until it 
is due .... " Id. 2 
The next issue that this presents is whether the District Court erred in determining that the 
date of acceleration was the date upon which the (first) Notice of Default was recorded, January 
29, 2008. See MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER RE: MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT, (hereinafter referred to as 'DECISION') R., Vol. III, p. 631. The District Court 
Judge cited to LC.§ 45-1506(12) as support for his conclusion that the recording of the Notice of 
Default was the trigger for the acceleration, this was error, see DECISION R., Vol. III pg. 631. 
LC.§ 45-1506(12) only deals with the statutory right to reinstate after the recording of the Notice 
of Default. 
The Deed of Trust, in paragraph 22, see R., Vol. I, p. 76, beginning at L. 2, specifically 
provides that the Lender must give thirty (30) days written notice of its intent to accelerate, prior 
to the recording of a Notice of Default. If the lender opts to accelerate, the very terms of the Deed 
of Trust requires acceleration to occur prior to recordation of the Notice of Default. The Deed of 
Trust states "( d) that failure to cure the default on or before the date specified in the notice may 
result in acceleration of the sums secured by this Security Instrument and sale of the property", 
Deed of Trust Paragraph 22, R., Vol. I, p. 76, (emphasis added). 
The January 22, 2008 letter, R., Vol. II, p. 384, was not equivocal at all but clearly states, 
"Your failure to cure said default on or before said date shall result in the acceleration 
(immediately becoming due and payable in full) of the entire sum secured by the loan security 
instrument .... ". The letter could not have been clearer or more plainly stated and in fact goes on 
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to explain how to reinstate the loan after the acceleration: "As provided in the loan security 
the to reinstate the loan acceleration ... are 
letters that the courts have found to be unclear as to acceleration: 
In re Crystal Properties, Ltd._ L.P., 268 F.3d 743, 751 (9th Cir. 2001): 
On February 23, 1995, the FDIC wrote: 
The FDIC has not setoff any account, nor has it taken any 
action of any kind under either real property secured or 
personal property secured loans. All the FDIC has done is to 
freeze accounts for which there are delinquent loans 
outstanding. Your loans however, are in default which 
invokls (sic) the default interest clause. 
( emphasis in original). The letter is silent as to the FDIC's option to 
accelerate. If any inference is to be drawn from this letter, it is that the FDIC 
had not exercised its option to accelerate because it states that the FDIC had 
not used Crystal's accounts at Guardian to pay do\\-n the loan. Although the 
FDIC did warn Crystal that its loans were in default, it failed to discuss 
acceleration, a necessary predicate for invocation of the clause. 
The Eighth Circuit has found less ambiguous language in a letter from the 
lender to be insufficient to trigger an option to accelerate and a default 
interest clause. See Tarkio Coll., 129 F.3d at 474-76. In Tarkio College, the 
holder of the note, First Bank, on May 14, 1991, wrote the debtor: 
This is to advise you, ... that First Bank deems Tarkio 
College in default of its promissory note to First Bank with 
respect to the referenced loan transaction. Accordingly First 
Bank requests Tarkio College to now come forward within 
the next ten (10) days with full payment of the unpaid 
principal, $862,396.39, and unpaid and accrued interest of 
$38,793.70 as of this day, 05/14/91. Interest is accruing at a 
rate of $283.528 per day. 
Id. at 474. Even though this letter clearly stated that the debtor was required 
to come forward with the full amount within ten days and that interest was 
accruing at a higher rate, the Eighth Circuit concluded that it "was 
ambiguous and, therefore, was not a 'clear and unequivocal' statement of 
the bank's intent to accelerate the loan." Id. at 475. 
The referenced letters cited in Crystal, differ substantially from the clear language of the 
letter at hand, using terms such as 'to come forward ... with full payment' and 'your loans are in 
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default', where the acceleration letter in this case specifically uses the terms 'acceleration', 'shall, 
further notice': "Your failure to cure said on or date shall in the 
acceleration (immediately becoming due and payable in full) of the entire sum secured by the loan 
security instrument and the immediate institution of foreclosure proceedings .... ". and the closing 
paragraph of said letter states: "No further notice will be given prior to the initiation oflegal action 
or foreclosure." See R., Vol. II, p. 384. 
Further, the Banking Entities own internal records and conduct after the initial letter 
corroborates and demonstrates that acceleration of the obligation occurred prior to recordation of 
the Deed of Trust: 
Chevy Chase Bank, F.S.B.'s own Collections/Customer Service Loan Activity Archive 
plainly shows that the loan was previously accelerated and a letter of the same was issued to 
Nathan Baughman on 09/04/08. See R., Vol III, p.600. The Activity Archive states that the '30-
day letter' had to be re-issued with Nathon Baughrnan's name on it and that the 30 days would 
expire on October 4, 2008 and further that this was explained to Melissa Baughman on the 
telephone on October 1, 2008, that the foreclosure process would begin on October 4, 2008; and 
that the foreclosure was approved on October 31, 2008. 





R. Vol. Hi, Pg. 599: 
COL 10/01/08 
COF HAD TO RE-ISSUE 30 DAY LETTER 
WITH HUSBAND NA THON 
BAUGHMAN ADDED LETTER EXP 
10/4/08 
COF XC046 056 - 30 day w/user options 
COF GC003 047 - C.Mail/Pulls Prop Add/2 Names 
COF GC004 052 - C.Mail/Pulls Mailing/I Name 
C07 MRSDOESNOTHAVEANY 








BUYERS. XPLNED 30 DAY 
EXPIRES ON 10/04, WILL 
PROCESS OF FCL. 
BEGIN ACTIVE 
INFORMED MRS LOAN HAS 
BEEN FORWARED (sic) TO 
FCL 
FORECLOSURE APPROVED 
Further support that the stated maturity date is not the date to trigger the running of the statute of 
limitations is found in the unpublished opinion of Martin v. Pioneer Title Co. of Ada Cty., No. 96438, 
1993 WL 381101, at *2 (Idaho Dist. July 8, 1993) which states that the statute of limitations 
begins to run at the date of default: 
As noted above, the last payment on the note was made on January 28, 1987; 
thus, the note went into default as of February 15, 1987, the date the next 
payment was due. Accordingly, the five year limitation period for an action 
to foreclose the deed of trust, LC.§§ 5-214A, 45-1515, began running at 
that time, and had not expired when the FSLIC became the conservator of 
American Savings on March 9, 1989 
See also, Bay Area Laundry & Dry Cleaning Pension Trust Fund v. Ferbar Corp. of California, 522 
U.S. 192, 209, 118 S. Ct. 542, 552, 139 L. Ed. 2d 553 (1997) 
Board of Trustees of Dist. No. 15 Machinists' Pension Fund v. Kahle 
Engineering Corp., 43 F.3d 852, 857 (C.A.3 1994) (" '[W]here there is an 
acceleration clause giving the creditor the right upon certain contingencies 
to declare the whole sum due, the statute begins to run, only with respect to 
each instalment, at the time the instalment becomes due, unless the creditor 
exercises his option to declare the whole indebtedness due, in which case 
the statute begins to run from the date of the exercise of his option.' ") 
(quoting 51 Am.Jur.2d, Limitation of Actions § 133 (1970)); see also 4 A. 
Corbin, Contracts§ 951 (1951) (emphasis added). 
There is strong support for the argument that the date of acceleration should be the date of default: 
See, Canadian Birkbeck Inv. & Sav. Co. v. Williamson, 32 Idaho 624, 186 P. 916,918 (1920) 
It is clear that the accrual of the cause of action must be determined from 
the acceleration clause in the mortgages. In the complaint filed in the court 
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of Alberta, and also in this action respondent relied upon the acceleration 
clause to declare the principal, interest, and moneys paid by it under the 
mortgages as due and payable. Where a contract contains an acceleration 
clause, positive in its tenns and without any optional features in it, a default 
under said clause renders the entire indebtedness due, and the statute of 
limitations runs from such default. Snyder v. Miller, 71 Kan. 410, 80 Pac. 
970, 69 L. R. A. 250, 114 Arn. St. Rep. 489; Buss v. Kemp Lumber Co., 23 
N. M. 567, 170 Pac. 54, L. R. A. 1918C, 1015; Lovell v. Goss, 45 Colo. 
304, 101 Pac. 72, 22 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1110, 132 Arn. St. Rep. 184. The 
default of appellant, as interpreted by the respondent under the acceleration 
clause, rendered the entire indebtedness thereunder due and payable. Its 
right of action then accrued, and the statute of limitations began to run from 
such default. Pridgeon v. Greathouse, 1 Idaho, 359; Osburn v. Hopkins, 160 
Cal. 501, 117 Pac. 519, Ann. Cas. 1913A, 413. 
Gebrueder Heidemann, K.G. v. A.M.R. Corp., 107 Idaho 275,688 P.2d 1180 (1984) deals 
with a deed of trust without a maturity date and deals with the type of situation that the 1999 
change in I.C. § 5-214A was meant to remedy. Likewise, Elliott v. Darwin Neibaur Farms, 138 
Idaho 774, 782, 69 P.3d 1035, 1043 (2003) dealt with an unstated maturity date. 
Acceleration of an obligation changes the maturity date. See: In re Solutia Inc., 379 B.R. 
473,484 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2007): 
Acceleration moves the maturity date from the original maturity date to the 
acceleration date and that date becomes the new maturity date. See Federal 
National Mortgage Assn. v. Miller, 123 Misc.2d 431,432,473 N.Y.S.2d 
743 (Sup. Co., Nassau Co., N.Y., Spec. Term, Part 1 1984) ("Federal 
Mortgage ") and Black's Law Dictionary (8th ed.2004)(acceleration is 
defined as "the advancing of a loan agreement's maturity date so that 
payment of the entire debt is due immediately.") 
It is black letter law that the maturity date of a loan is advanced when the loan is accelerated. See, 
Am. Mut. Bldg. & Loan Co. v. Kesler, 64 Idaho 799, 137 P.2d 960,962 (1943): 
But the court had no power or authority to defer maturity of installments 
already matured by election under the acceleration clause of the contract. 
Canadian Birkbeck Investment & Sav. Co. v. Williamson, 32 Idaho 624, 
631, 186 P. 916. 
October 21, 1935, appellant availed itself of the benefits of 
the acceleration clause contained m the contract and "elected 
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to accelerate the maturity on all the installments of the said note not then 
due." That election matured all installments of the contract sued upon for 
all purposes, not only in Utah but in Idaho as well. The bar of the statute of 
limitations then began to run against the unmatured installments 
and continued to run against past due installments, so it made no difference 
whether installments were then past due or not yet matured, as far as the 
statute of limitations was concerned in the foreclosure case. 
Section 2. a of cross-appellant's argument would have you read the paragraph of the loan stating a 
precise maturity date in a vacuum and not as an integrated portion of a loan that has clauses that become 
triggered by the happening of a particular event, which event may or may not occur, but for which the 
loan provides a contingency for, such as default by the borrower resulting in acceleration by the lender. 
Cross-appellant cites the language of the loan dealing with acceleration and in the next breath 
attempts to state that said acceleration does not affect the maturity date of the loan, in contradiction 
to the plain unambiguous meaning of the very term, 'acceleration' 
For a definition of maturity, see Gov't of the Virgin Islands v. Brown, 221 F.2d 402, 405 
(3d Cir. 1955): 
'Maturity, when applied to commercial paper, means the time when the 
paper becomes due and demandable, that is, the time when an action can be 
maintained thereon to enforce payment' 
Prop. Acceptance Corp. v. Zitin, 414 F. Supp. 2d 534, 537 (E.D. Pa. 2005): 'absent acceleration, 
each missed installment payment is a separate default' citing, Bd. of Trustees of Dist. No. 15 
Machinists' Pension Fund v. Kahle Eng'g Corp., 43 F.3d 852 (3d Cir. 1994). 
The Banking Entities urge that the term 'maturity date' be viewed in isolation of the 
remainder of the Deed of Trust which is illogical. See Brobeck, Phleger & Harrison v. Telex Corp., 
602 F.2d 866, 872 (9th Cir. 1979): 
In performing our judicial function of interpretation, we note that "it is 
beyond question that every provision of a contract should be examined to 
determine the meaning and intention of the parties .... the meaning of words 
contained in a contract is to be determined not from a consideration of the 
words alone but from a reading of the entire contract." Sunset Securities Co. 
v. Coward McCann, Inc., 47 Cal.2d 907, 911, 306 P.2d 777, 779 (1957). 
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Applied to 
We seek to interpret the contract in a manner that makes the contract 
internally consistent. 
case at hand, date that the Banking rely so heavily, is 
not in the Deed of Trust, pursuant to which they foreclosed, but in the Promissory Note. The Deed 
of Trust references the 204 7 date as what it truly is, simply the last date the installments would be 
due if they had all been timely made and if the obligation had not been accelerated. The Banking 
Entities conducted a non-judicial foreclosure sale on January 13 of 2010, which sale was rescinded 
on May 20, 2011, see R., Vol. Ip. 215, Notice of Rescission of Trustee's Deed Upon Sale. 
What must be clear and what Appellants' believe is getting lost in the forest developed by 
all the foregoing arguments is that the Notice of Default recorded pursuant to the non-judicial 
foreclosure statutes was not the notice of default that accelerated the maturity date under the Deed 
of Trust for which Defendants bring their foreclosure action. The Baughmans' failure to pay 
pursuant to the Note and the letters from the lender thereafter proclaiming default and acceleration 
according to the lender's contractual rights under the Deed of Trust, was the relevant conduct 
defining the "maturity date". The only evidentiary value of the 1/29/2009 Notice of Default was 
corroboration that the lender previously accelerated the full amount due. 
Further, that Deeds of Trust and Notes and violations as well as the interpretation thereof 
is governed by contract law and do not sound in equity and therefore conflicts in the evidence 
should be resolved by a jury and not the Court. As stated previously, the Court found that 
Baughmans brought an action for breach of contract as a result of violations by the lender of the 
terms of covenants of the contract-Deed of Trust and Note. R., Vol. III, p. 627, last sentence of the 
first full paragraph. The Court should have ruled on the Plaintifrs breach of Contract allegations 
initially under the standard of proof applied as if a jury were the ultimate trier of fact. See David 
Steed & Associates, Inc. v. Youn2:, 115 Idaho 247, 248, 766 P.2d 717, 718 (1988). Under the 
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foregoing standard, the Banking Entities Motion for Summary Judgment should have been denied 
matter set first before a jury on the contract issues thereafter the jury verdict to used 
as advisory to the equitable issues of foreclosure. See Idaho First Nat. Bank v. Bliss Valley Foods, 
Inc., 121 Idaho 266,824 P.2d 841 (1991). 
The Courts, jumping from the standards of review applicable to actions to be tried by a jury 
and that of where a Court is the trier of fact was a misapplication of the law. The arguments as to 
when the acceleration occurred under the contract all relate to contract theories and whether lenders 
followed the terms of the agreement. 
With the foregoing having been said, on page 22 of their Response/Opening Brief the 
Banking Entities state "The Baughmans cite to no evidence that acceleration occurred earlier than 
the January 29, 2009 notice." See Response Brief at pg. 22. This is incorrect. See Opening Brief 
at pg. 7 where the Baughmans reference the January 22, 2008 letter from Chevy Chase giving 30 
days notice of acceleration and the 1 /29/09 Notice of Default, R., Vol. 1 p. 289, which states that 
the loan had previously been accelerated. 
Bakkerv. ThunderSpring-Wareham,LLC, 141 Idaho 185,190, 108P.3d332,337(2005), 
Cited by the Banking Entities, after the quotation cited by the Banking Entities, Combined 
Response Brief p. 10, ("When the language of a contract is clear and unambiguous, its 
interpretation and legal effect are questions oflaw."), goes on to state: 
The purpose of interpreting a contract is to determine the intent of the 
contracting parties at the time the contract was entered. In determining the 
intent of the parties, this Court must view the contract as a whole. 
2. Breach of Trust Deed via rescission of a prior non-judicial foreclosure sale. 
Rescission of Foreclosure Sale. The cases cited by the Banking Entities in support of their 
argument concerning the validity of their rescission of the non-judicial foreclosure which vested 
title of the subject property to UBS Investment, which they claim to be a non-entity, are not Idaho 
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cases; are distinguishable from the case at hand; and inapplicable. As to the conduct of the Banking 
transferring 
seems to be of first impression as appears to be no Idaho cases on point. cases cited by 
the Banking Entities deal only with general points of law and are not fact specific to the issues at 
hand. 
State of Or. By & Through Div. of State Lands v. Bureau of Land Mgmt., Dep't of the 
Interior, U.S., 876 F.2d 1419 (9th Cir. 1989), while stating a 'general rule of property law' dealt 
with the burden of proof at the lower court level, and while it cites to Moffat v. United States, 112 
U.S. 24, 25, 5 S. Ct. 10, 11, 28 L. Ed. 623 (1884), the direct quote, cited in State of Or., cannot be 
found in Moffat, which was a suit to cancel patents. 
The Banking Entities also cite to Buckeye Ret. Co., LLC., LTD v. Walter, 2012 Ark. App. 
257, 404 S.W.3d 173 (2012), an Arkansas case, for the quotation: ("[I]n conveyances of real 
property the grantee must be a legal entity, so that title can vest in an individual, partnership, 
or a corporation."), see Response/Opening Brief at bottom of page 25. What the Banking 
Entities omitted from the quote was what preceded the section they quote: "In other words, 
Arkansas law requires ... " (emphasis added). Here is the full quote from Buckeye: 
In other words, Arkansas law requires that in conveyances of real 
property the grantee must be a legal entity, so that title can vest in an 
individual, partnership, or a corporation. 
Likewise, with the Texas case cited, Parham Family Ltd. P'ship v. Morgan, 434 S.W.3d 
774, 787 (Tex. App. 2014) the case stated: "in Texas, "a deed is void if the grantee is not in 
existence at the time the deed is executed", Parham. 
Further, the Idaho Code under which the Banking Entities rescinded the Trustee's Deed 
upon Sale, LC. § 45-1510(2), specifically states that the Notice of Recession shall state: "the reason 
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for rescission.". The Notice of Rescission of Trustee's Deed Upon Sale, R., Vol. I 215, states 
reason the rescission as: 
5.) THAT THE TRUSTEE has been informed by the Beneficiary that the 
beneficiary desires to rescind the Trustee's Deed recorded upon the 
foreclosure sale which was conducted in error due to a failure to 
communicate timely, notice of conditions which would have warranted a 
cancellation for the foreclosure which did occur on 1/8/201 O; 
Now, the Banking Entities claim that the rescission was because title was held by a 'non-entity'. 
The language quoted above is from the Idaho Codes sample Notice of Recession of Trustee's Deed 
Upon Sale, which states that Notice 'shall be in substantially the following form'. The plain intent 
of the statute was that the actual reasons necessitating the rescission be stated. 
The Banking Entities also fail to state any valid reason why it took them 16 months to 
discover their error and rescind the trustee sale. Every contract contains a covenant of good faith 
and fair dealing. See, Idaho First Nat. Bank v. Bliss Valley Foods, Inc., 121 Idaho 266,287, 824 
P.2d 841, 862 (1991): 
In Luzar v. Western Surety, 107 Idaho 693,692 P.2d 337 (1984), this Court, 
without defining the nature of the covenant involved, stated that, "Good 
faith and fair dealing are implied obligations of every contract." 107 Idaho 
at 696, 692 P.2d at 340. In Metcalf v. Intermountain Gas Co., 116 Idaho 
622, 778 P.2d 744 (1989) 
Which then goes on to define the covenant of good faith and fair dealing as 'Any action by either 
party which violated, nullifies or significantly impairs any benefit' to the contracting parties. 
Not only did the Notice of Rescission (R., Vol., II, p. 390) fail to state that the reason the 
deed was rescinded was that the property had been sold to a non-entity, but that there was no valid 
proof that UBS was a non-entity under the rules of evidence nor a proper foundation laid as to the 
status of UBS as the affidavits of Amber Dina and JoJo Mensah should have been stricken and 
allowing them in was an abuse of discretion. The Affidavits lack foundation and contain 
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inadmissible hearsay pursuant to IRE Rules 701, 801 and 802. 
3. The Baughmans were to damages for loss of mesne profits. An owner of 
property is entitled to mesne profits when they are kept from utilizing their property due to its 
being wrongfully possessed by another. See United States v. Langendorf, 322 F.2d 25, 25 (9th 
Cir. 1963). 
If the Court accepts the Banking Entities arguments above that UBS was a non-entity and 
the sale which dispossessed the Baughman's from their property invalid, the Banking Entities 
knew or should have kno"'TI that the Trustee's Deed on Sale was to an entity that could not hold 
title. See Banking Entities Memorandum in Support of Defendants Motion for Summary 
Judgment and Alternative Motion for Summary Adjudication oflssues, R. Vol. II p. 321, where 
they refer to the assignments to UBS Investment Bank as 'the "Errant Assignments"'. The 
Banking Entities now claim that the entity doesn't exist when, in fact it clearly does. See Combined 
Response/Opening Brief at pg. 30. 
Based upon the foregoing, the Banking Entities wrongfully deprived the Baughmans of the 
use of the property for the 16 months prior to their attempts to unwind what they now refer to as 
'the invalid foreclosure sale'. They dispossessed the Baughmans of the property and did not 
inform them of the wrongful foreclosure after having set aside the sale and deprived them of their 
mesne profits. See Combined Response/Opening Brief at pg. 26. 
Again, the foregoing is a breach of the lenders' duties under the Note and Deed of Trust 
and should have been reviewed under the standard as if the trier of fact would be a jury not the 
Court. Baughmans should have been given the benefit of all favorable inferences which might be 
reasonably drawn from the evidence as, clearly, the evidence propounded by Baughmans in 
objection to the motion for summary judgment contained conflicting inferences which in view 
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thereof reasonable minds might reach different conclusions. Therefor Defendant's motion for 
judgment should have been denied. 
4. US Bank is not the proper holder of of Trust entitled to foreclose the 
Property. See Combined Response/Opening Brief at pg. 7. In support of this argument the Banking 
Entities claim that "The Baughmans Produced No Evidence to Contradict US Bank's Evidence 
that it is the Holder of the Note and Deed of Trust.", see Combined Response/Opening Brief at pg. 
28. This claim is not supported by the record. 
The, unopposed, Affidavit of Melissa K. Baughman in Support of Plaintiffs; Motion for 
Reconsideration R. Vol. III pp. 648-686, including Exhibits, has several items of proof that US 
Bank is not the proper holder of the Deed of Trust. Said Affidavit has exhibits from the MERS 
website, https://Wvvw.nmers.com, accessed by Melissa K. Baughman on July 15, 2015 which show 
that on that date the Servicer for the Deed of Trust was Capital One. N.A., and not US Bank. See 
R., Vol. III, p. 661, printout from MERS website of Baughman Mortgage, see also R., Vol. III, p. 
p. 660, phone log from Chevy Chase Bank. The Affidavit further stated that Melissa K. 
Baughman, on the same web site accessed her loan/Deed of Trust for investor information and 
found that on July 15, 2015 the MERS website reported that the investor for this loan/Deed of 
Trust was UBS Real Estate Securities, Inc. see R., Vol. III, p. 652, and p. 661-662. The exhibits 
referred to in Melissa K. Baughman's Affidavit were not objected to by the Banking Entities and 
demonstrate that there is indeed a material issue of fact as to whether US Bank has any connection 
to the loan/Deed of Trust and whether they are a proper party to be conducting a foreclosure sale 
on the subject property. As has become more common, this loan and deed of trust have been 
securitized, pooled and assigned so many times that it is not surprising the chain of title is 
convoluted. 
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The Banking Entities cite to the record at R., Vol. II, p. 343 for the proposition that UBS 
Investment Bank is not a legal entity, see Combined Response/Opening Brief at pg. 5,. The 
argument is misleading as the document at the cited location is the objected to, self-serving, 
hearsay Affidavit of Amber M. Dina. See R., Vol. II pps. 370-374, Appellants Baughmans' 
Objection and Motion to Strike Portions of Affidavits of JoJo Mensah and Amber Dina. 
In support of the hearsay nature of the aforesaid affidavits and the inadmissibility of the 
attachments please see discussion of admissibility of website information in In re Ancona, No. 14-
10532 CGM, 2016 WL 828099, at *11 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Mar. 2, 2016), re-argument denied, No. 
14-10532-CGM, 2016 WL 1399265 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Apr. 6, 2016): (please note that this is an 
unpublished opinion): 
("An affidavit or declaration used to support or oppose a motion must be 
made on personal knowledge, set out facts that would be admissible in 
evidence, and show that the affiant or declarant is competent to testify on 
the matters stated."); accord Presbyterian Church of Sudan v. Talisman 
Energy, Inc., 582 F.3d 244, 264 (2d Cir. 2009) ("only admissible evidence 
need be considered by the trial court in ruling on a motion for summary 
judgment."); cf Madanat v. First Data Corp., 282 F.R.D. 304, 311 
(E.D.N.Y.2012) (finding that "information displayed on a website is 
hearsay that is not admissible under any exception"); Novak v. Tucows, Inc., 
No. 06-CV-1909, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21269, at *15-19 (E.D.N.Y. 
Mar. 26, 2007) (granting motion to strike certain exhibits of web page 
printouts as hearsay and for lack of authentication under F ed.R.Evid. 901 ); 
US v. Jackson, 208 F.3d 633,637 (7th Cir. 2000) ("The web postings were 
not statements made by declarants testifying at trial, and they were being 
offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted. That means they were 
hearsay.") (citing Federal Rule of Evidence 801). 
Idaho has adopted the Federal Rules of Evidence, see State v. Woodbury, 127 Idaho 757, 
760, 905 P.2d 1066, 1069 (Ct. App. 1995). Baughmans objected to the Affidavits of JoJo Mensah 
and Amber Dina as hearsay and lacking foundation. See R., Vol. II, p. 370-374, Baughmans 
Objection and Motion to Strike Portions of Affidavits of JoJo Mensah and Amber Dina. Amber 
Dina and JoJo Mensah's affidavit did not include their qualifications and experience as to laying 
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appropriate foundation as to interpretation of the internet web information nor as to how it was 
compiled and by whom. The portions of the Amber Dina and Mensah Affidavits and the 
exhibits, print-outs from websites, was not within Amber Dina's personal knowledge; were clearly 
hearsay, if not hearsay within hearsay; lacked foundation; self- serving, and should have been 
stricken. 
Further, when an attorney files an affidavit in a case they represent: In re Meeker, No. 
10-04927-MAM-13, 2011 WL 2650686, at *3 (Bankr. S.D. Ala. July 6, 2011), report and 
recommendation adopted, No. 10-04927-MAM-13, 2011 WL 7178926 (Bankr. S.D. Ala. July 6, 
2011): 
Mr. Wooten's affidavit contains a variety of statements, some of which that 
could have been attested to by other witnesses. At times, Mr. Wooten states 
his opinion or belief regarding potential issues and evidence in this case. 
Overall, it is not clear which portions of Mr. Wooten's affidavit should be 
taken as fact statements and which portions are advocacy on behalf of his 
client, and the affidavit is improper. Even if were proper for Mr. Wooten to 
submit an affidavit in a case where he is also the lawyer for one of the 
parties, it contains inadmissible hearsay. It is proper to strike the Affidavit 
ofNicholas Wooten. 
(e) Printout from Standard & Poor's website 
This printout that is apparently from the Standard & Poor's website has not 
been authenticated in accord with Federal Rule of Evidence 901, nor is it a 
self-authenticating document in accord with Federal Rule of Evidence 902. 
It appears that the Plaintiff is offering it for the truth of its content, making 
it inadmissible hearsay. 
It is proper to strike the printout from the Standard & Poor's website. 
It should be noted that Idaho Rules of Evidence 901 and 902 are substantially the same as Federal 
Rules of Evidence 901 and 902. 
III. 
THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS WAS NOT 
TOLLED BY THE BAUGHMANS' BANKRUPTCY 
The Banking Entities argument that the Baughmans bankruptcy filing tolled the running of 
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the statute of limitations is in error. Case law states that the automatic stay does not toll, stay or 
otherwise suspend the running of a creditors statute of limitations. See In re Bigelow, 393 B.R. 
667, 670 (B.A.P. 8th Cir. 2008): 
Mitchell contends that the automatic stay suspends, and thus extends, the 
limitations period. But this argument misconstrues the operation and effect of § 
108(c)(l).8 Section 108(c)(l) does not independently toll or suspend statutes of 
limitations which have not expired as of a bankruptcy petition date.9 
( emphasis added) 
The reference in§ 108(c) to 'suspension' of time limits clearly does not operate in 
itself to stop the running of a statute of limitations; rather, this language merely 
incorporates suspensions of deadlines that are expressly provided in other federal 
or state statutes. 10 
Mitchell has not identified any non-bankruptcy federal or state statute that 
suspends or tolls the statute of limitations applicable to his claim against the 
Debtors, nor has he provided any grounds to justify a departure from this well-
established interpretation of§ 108( c ). Therefore, we conclude that § 108( c) did not 
extend the statute of limitations on Mitchell's cause of action against the Debtors 
beyond October 29, 2007. In this case, the automatic stay had no effect on the 
statute of limitations, and the bankruptcy court had no authority to extend it. 11 
See also, In re Michael Angelo Corry Inn. Inc., 297 B.R. 447,451 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 2003); In re 
Bodenstein, 248 B.R. 808,817 (Bankr. W.D. Ark.) affd, 253 B.R. 46 (B.A.P. 8th Cir. 2000) both 
holding that absent a separate agreement with the debtor, a creditors statute of limitation is not 
tolled by a debtor's bankruptcy. See also, In re Roth, 171 B.R. 357, 364 (Bankr. D.S.D. 1994), 
citing to In re Morton, 866 F.2d 561 (2d Cir.1989), which also discussed the length of time the 
creditor had when the debtors were not in bankruptcy and found it inequitable to toll the running 
of the statute of limitations. Here the creditor had years to file an action and not only chose not 
to, but did not file a Relief From Stay Motion in the Baughmans bankruptcy. 
Further the District Court Decision being appealed from did not address the issue of the 
tolling of the statute of limitations, therefore there is no issue/error to appeal from. However, 
Baughmans assert, as per the cited cases that their bankruptcy did NOT toll the running of the 
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statute of limitations. See McPheters v. Maile, 138 Idaho 391,397, 64 P.3d 317,323 (2003): 
[Appellant]. .. raises several other issues on appeal.. .. [issues] To properly an 
issue on appeal there must either be an adverse ruling by the court below or the 
issue must have been raised in the court below, an issue cannot be raised for the 
first time on appeal. Whitted v. Canyon County Bd. of Comm'rs., 137 Idaho 118, 
121-22,44P.3d 1173, 1176-77 (2002). 
Baughmans filed for Chapter 7 on June 4, 2009, R., Vol. II, p. 446 and received their 
Discharge on September 4, 2009, R., Vol. II, p. 492. (92 days). Even, if this Court accepted that 
at the minimum the acceleration date clearly and unequivocally occurred and began on October 4, 
2008 as argued above, the action for judicial foreclosure action should have been brought by the 
Banking Entities as of October 4, 2014. As it stands, the Banking Entities action for judicial 
foreclosure was filed as of January 24, 2014-five (5) years and one hundred and twelve days (112) 
days. One Hundred and Twelve (112) days after the statute of limitations had run. If the Court 
agrees with their arguments that the statute of limitations was tolled by the bankruptcy by the 92 
days, they are still 20 days beyond the statute of limitations. 
IV. 
IT WAS ERROR TO CONCLUDE THAT 
THE DATE OF THE NOTICE OF DEFAULT 
WAS THE DATE OF ACCELERATION 
The Notice of Default plainly states that "the Beneficiary under said Deed of Trust. . . has 
declared ... all sums secured thereby immediately due and payable ... " ( emphasis added). See R. 
Vol. I, p. 289. Each and every Notice of Default references the past due amount as being owing 
from January 1, 2008 stating "The monthly installment of principal and interest plus impounds 
which became due on 1/1/2008 and all subsequent installments ... " (emphasis added). See R. Vol. 
I, p. 385, Notice of Default recorded June 28, 2011 as instrument number 2316374000- Kootenai 
County, Idaho; 
While the Notice of Default was recorded on January 29, 2009, it was prepared prior to 
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the date ofrecordation, having been signed on January 26, 2009 and in fact the banks activity log 
the account was sent to attorney to start the foreclosure on November 10, 2008, see R., 
Vol. III, p. 598. 
V. 
ATTORNEY FEES AND COSTS 
The Baughmans have requested an award of attorney fees and costs on appeal pursuant to 
LC.§ 12-121 and if they prevail in this appeal and pursuant to Rule 41 of the Idaho Appellate 
Rules as previously set out in its initial briefing and argues the same standards apply here in 




The Banking Entities inflammatory comments about Baughmans seeking a 'windfall' are 
red herrings meant to cloud the true issues of their failure to comply properly with the legal 
requirements imposed upon them and obfuscate their failure to timely or properly foreclose on the 
subject property. This case isn't about a windfall to the Baughrnans, it is about the Banking 
Entities being legally accountable for their failure to comport with the law. While the numerous 
errors at the district court which are herein appealed, the most significant and impacting is the trial 
courts erroneous ruling on the date on which acceleration occurred. 
The Banking Entities spurious and inflammatory comments about a 'windfall' to the 
Baughmans seek to redirect the proper inquiry here, which is whether the Banking Entities have 
complied with what is required of them pursuant to the terms of the Deed of Trust and controlling 
law, which they have not. The banking industry is a highly regulated industry for a reason. When 
a lender/servicer does not follow the established rules they claim that the borrower is trying to get 
a 'free house', as if the emotional turmoil caused by the banking systems ignoring of failed 
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compliance and being in a state of flux due to the lenders errors and/or omissions for years on end 
is just something the borrowers should have to put up with, they did, after all, default on their 
payments and that alone should absolve the lender from having to adhere to proper procedures, 
such as deal with transfers, assignments, securitization, pooling, etc. Of course most lenders 
cannot even attempt to untangle the web of documents associated with their loans/deeds of trusts. 
A windfall is not the issue, the issues are, did the Court apply the correct standard of review 
to the causes of action?; did the Court error in its application of the evidentiary rules as to the 
affidavits supplied by the Banking Entities and the Baughmans?; did the Court apply the case law 
correctly as to the evidence and thereafter abuse its discretion as to its interpretation of the 
evidence?; and as a result of the foregoing should the Court have granted Defendant's motion for 
summary judgment; denied the Baughman's motion for summary judgment and dismissed their 
claims. Further, the Court should grant Baughman's their attorney fees and costs and deny 
Defendant's claims for attorney fees and costs. 
As Baughmans have set forward and in its previous opening brief, this Court should remand 
the matter to District Court to set aside the Memorandum Decision and Order Re: Summary 
Judgment and the Judgment and Amended Judgment as it was error not to grant Baughman's 
motion for summary judgment and deny Defendants. Further, if this Court is not able to find the 
forgoing, to remand the matter with instructions to set aside the findings of the District Court and 
judgments and to set the matter for further proceedings-jury trial. 
of August, 2016. 
MADSEN LAW OFFICES, P.C. 
Attorney fm: 'Appellants 
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